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The United Arab Emirates as an Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans: 
The Case of Strategic Investment in Serbia 
 
Will Bartlett, James Ker-Lindsay, Kristian Alexander & Tena Prelec 
 
 
Abstract: In recent years, the United Arab Emirates has increased its engagement on 
the international stage. One area where it has been increasingly active is the Western 
Balkans. While its aid programmes were initially directed towards Albania, it has also 
started to invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. This 
paper focuses mainly on the last of these: UAE commercial investment in Serbia. As 
is shown, this activity has been focused on four key sectors: aviation, urban 
construction, military technology and agriculture, chosen to reflect different strategic 
imperatives. Whereas investments in agriculture and military technologies are part of 
a strategy of risk mitigation in respect of food security and military security, the 
investments in aviation and construction form part of a wider strategic policy of 
economic diversification in anticipation of the post-oil economy. Meanwhile, viewed 
from the Serbian perspective, these investments have not been without controversy 
because of their lack of transparency, allegations of corruption, and lack of public 
debate over plans to transform downtown Belgrade with a substantial new investment 
in urban regeneration. Serbia’s willingness to host strategic investment from the UAE 
is also surprising because of UAE support for Kosovo and claims that it has come 
with questionable political demands. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that UAE 
investments are a welcome boost to an ailing and crisis ridden economy. 
 




In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to the fundamental 
transformation that is taking place in the foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Once regionally focused, the country has become increasingly global in its 
outlook. A key part of this radical change in its international engagement has been the 
 2 
growing use of foreign direct investment to achieve key foreign policy and security 
goals. 
One country where UAE investments have had a profound effect is Serbia. 
Following its purchase by Etihad, the Air Serbia airline has become a leading regional 
carrier, cementing Belgrade’s position as a regional transport hub. Meanwhile, a 
UAE-funded project to transform Belgrade’s dilapidated riverfront has the potential to 
radically transform the city. The UAE has also invested heavily in both agriculture 
and the defence industry. These projects have raised many questions and concerns. 
Observers have been surprised, if not rather confused, by the extent to which the UAE 
has shown an interest in Serbia. At the same time, there are questions as to why 
Serbia should have sought to build a strong relationship with a country that has taken 
such a firm stance in favour of the recognition of Kosovo, which unilaterally seceded 
from Serbia in February 2008. Additionally, reports have emerged that there are 
further politically sensitive aspects to the relationship. 
The article explores the underlying rationale behind the relationship that has 
developed between the UAE and Serbia. In doing so, it not only contributes to a better 
understanding of the foreign policy aims and activities of the UAE in Serbia, but also 
explains why Serbia has been willing to engage with the UAE. To start with, the 
article explores the UAEs foreign policy motives in relation to aid and investment 
around the world and investigates the political, economic and geo-strategic 
motivations for the growing involvement of UAE in the Western Balkans. It maps the 
flows of UAE aid and commercial investment in the Balkans and sets this against an 
exploration of the nature, aims and effects of development aid and commercial 
investment from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which provides the 
wider context for the paper. Following on from this, the article investigates the 
commercial investment of UAE in Serbia, focusing on the sectors of aviation, urban 
construction, military technology, and agriculture. The next section examines the 
political differences between the two countries over Kosovo and the reasons why 
Serbia changed its position and became willing to receive inflows of commercial 
investment from the UAE. Finally, the article concludes with an analysis how far 
these investment flows have met the aims expressed by the two sides and draws 
together some conclusions for the future development of UAE foreign policy and 
involvement in the Balkans as a whole. 
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2 United Arab Emirates’ foreign policy motives 
During the time of the late founding father and first president, Shaikh Zayed Bin 
Sultan Al Nahyan, the foreign policy of the UAE was predominantly “idealistic” in its 
orientation and centred on the Arab-world.
1
 Essentially, the focus was on preserving 
the country’s sovereignty and newly won independence.2 Since 2004, with the passing 
of Sheikh Zayed, and the emergence of Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the 
UAE has gradually pursued a more global foreign policy. This has partly been the 
result of the emergence of new foreign policy elites in the UAE, while strategic and 
economic considerations have also had a role to play as elaborated further below.
3
 
Indeed, the younger cohort is mainly tied to a realist school of foreign policy that 
emphasises economics and the balance of power as the main tenets of contemporary 
foreign policy. Benefitting from a modern and international education, the focus of 
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this next generation is to defend the country’s vast global investments. This has in 
turn led to a more confident and assertive foreign policy orientation,
4
 but one based 
on pragmatism that avoids, “rushed and impulsive decisions”.5 
A central figure in this process has been Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-
Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and younger brother of Khalifa.
6
 
Mohammed wields considerable power as special advisor to the President of the UAE 
and in his roles as the deputy supreme commander of the UAE Armed Forces and the 
head of Mubadala, the main investment vehicle of the government of Abu Dhabi. His 
role is particularly important inasmuch as while there are a range of actors and 
decision makers who help to shape the foreign policy process, the Office of the 
President of the UAE is the formal decision-making centre. It is believed to 
implement and reflect a common understanding of broader networks and concerns, 
such as the Supreme Council of the Federation, a governmental body made up of the 
leaders of all seven Emirates, but is said to be strongly influenced by the rulers of 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the two biggest Emirates.
7
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
some latitude in routine affairs. However, its influence, through the office of the 
Foreign Minister, is relatively minor. The Foreign Minister cannot make decisions on 
his own. Rather, he beholden to the President.
8
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Generally speaking, small states have been considered fairly irrelevant in 
terms of influence and the ability to project power in the international arena.
9
 
However, the UAE, along with another Gulf state, Qatar, has demonstrated that small 
states have acquired a significant soft power capability that allows them to challenge 
the mainstream understanding of power in an interconnected world.
10
 This has been 
facilitated by several factors. For a start, oil and gas have consolidated the position of 
the UAE as the second biggest economy in the Arab world. The income generated by 
energy – predominantly from the largest and most resource-abundant Emirate, Abu 
Dhabi – has been crucial. Secondly, the UAE has also benefited from the decline of 
traditional Middle Eastern powers, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran, which has seen 
a resulting rise in both the affluence and influence of the countries of the GCC.
11
 This 
has enabled the UAE to step into the ensuing vacuum and make its own presence felt. 
Thirdly, the UAE has benefited from an advantageous geographic position between 
West and East. It enjoys proximity to many of the world’s expanding markets, has 
established a reputation as a politically stable and investor-friendly country in an 




At the same time, the UAE has benefited from political, economic and 
military stability. While the country is situated in a volatile region, it has succeeded in 
fending off various internal and external security threats.
13
 Given that the UAE’s 
defence capabilities are insufficient to counter regional threats, it has relied primarily 
on a Western security umbrella for protection. Port Jebel Ali is the US Navy’s most 
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active liberty port and serves (along with Port Rashid) as a major transit hub for US 
military goods. The airbase in Al-Dhafra houses about 100 US military personnel 
working for the US Air Force and the CIA.
14
 The UAE has also emerged as major 
customer for US and European arms suppliers. Although the UAE has begun 
manufacturing some of its own military equipment, it is still strongly committed to 
buying custom made military equipment from western arms companies.
15
 In addition 
to this, the UAE has sought to maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty 
through a deep involvement in the international system with active membership and 
participation in international agencies and organisations. The UAE has joined most 
UN organisations and affiliates, as well as regional Arab and Islamic organisations 
such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the GCC. More recently, the 
UAE has also taken part in international peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions 
in order to maintain regional security, but also to signal the country’s sense of 
international responsibility. In doing so, “the UAE is thus presenting itself as an 
ethical actor, a reliable ally which (unlike other Arab countries) is playing its part in 
the fight against terrorism and in ensuring regional stability.”16 
The UAE has, however, faced international criticism from human rights 
organizations concerning the human rights situation of laborers working in the 
construction industry. Several private companies hired to complete government 
projects have been accused, and in several cases found guilty, of contractual 
deception and ill treatment of workers. In addition, the UAE government has shut 
down various think tanks, such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Gulf 
Research Center, accusing them of meddling in its internal affairs and revoking their 
licenses to operate in the country. According to Human Rights Watch, the 
government has imposed several restrictions on the freedom of speech and assembly. 
For example, Article 28 of the law stipulates the punishment of imprisonment and 
large fines for anyone who uses information technology to incite actions that 
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endangers state security or infringes on the public order. Despite these criticisms, the 
UAE has successfully promoted itself as model of an economically prosperous and 
politically stable society.  
Yet, the UAE faces a string of emerging economic and social difficulties 
including falling oil prices and high youth unemployment. The federal government 
has been concerned about the impact these problems will have on the government 
budget and on public sector spending. It has reacted by imposing spending cuts, 
taxation, and cancelling some current government projects. Led by the emirates of 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the UAE has also sought to forge a diversified economy. Laws 
have been enacted to protect and expand foreign direct investment and relax 
sponsorship rules, especially through the creation of so-called economic free zones in 
which companies do not have to adhere to federal law. This image is further 
strengthened by the fact that it has three major airports, two international airlines and 
two major ports. At the same time, the UAE has also branded itself by emphasising 
luxury tourism and its supportive infrastructural development. The country’s 
reputation as a tax-free haven, its business-friendly environment, adoption of the 
latest technology and the pro-investment approach of the government have also 
helped to boost its economic growth.
17
 As a result, the UAE is now seen as a safe 




This growing economic strength has also led to greater international 
engagement. This has been seen in several ways. It is well known that countries often 
use aid as a foreign policy instrument. The UAE is no exception. Foreign aid has 
become a hallmark of its foreign policy. Since the inception of its aid programme, in 
1971, the UAE has gained good relations with many countries. Through official 
channels like the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), the UAE Red Crescent 
Authority, the Zayed Charitable Foundation and numerous other entities, the UAE is a 
leading foreign aid donor at regional and international levels.
19
 More recently, the 
Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid was established in 2008 to pursue an 
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integrated sustainable approach to provision of aid. It was subsequently merged with 
the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development, which was officially 
mandated to propose foreign aid policies, raise the profile of the UAE as a major 
donor, and support the foreign aid decision-making process. The stated philosophy 
behind the provision of aid is two-fold: first, it is dictated by an Islamic belief that 
helping those in need is a primary duty; and second, that part of the country’s wealth 
from oil and gas should be devoted to assisting less fortunate countries and 
individuals.
20
 However, while religion is an important motive for providing assistance 
to countries with predominantly Muslim populations, it is not the sole driving force. 
Other factors such as rewarding allies in military conflicts or building strategic 
alliances also play a role. More to the point, foreign aid also supports commercial 
interests by encouraging recipients to open their doors to investments.
21
  
It is this last factor that is is now gaining greater significance. Like other GCC 
states, the UAE has steadily increased its foreign direct investments (FDI) around the 
globe. The aim has been to channel surplus oil revenues into long-term foreign 
investments through a small number of state owned entities or state-backed private 
companies.
22
 The growth of outward FDI began in 2000 and has continued at a rapid 
pace, averaging US$3 billion per annum in recent years. By 2015 the total stock of 
UAE investments abroad reached US$63 billion. These investments reflect a desire to 
minimise the effects of oil price fluctuations. International investments through 
sovereign wealth funds are aimed at seeking higher returns, while creating a financial 




Importantly, however, the investments that have been made have been aligned 
to the specificities of the UAE economy as a “rentier state”, in which economic 
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diversification supports the political, economic and social structures that have 
developed during the transition from a pre-industrial economy to an oil and service 
economy, by-passing the intermediary stage of industrialisation.
24
 Thus, the sectors 
into which the economic diversification strategy has been directed have been in 
services such as transport and construction and in key import sectors such as food and 
armaments. The striking absence in this strategy has been a diversification into 
industrial activity, especially that related to small and medium scale industries, which 
would potentially form the basis of a new middle class that might be capable of 
challenging the entrenched power of the tribal elites. Even where the UAE economy 
has ventured into some elements of an industrial economy, such as the arms industry, 
this has been on the basis of state sponsored production under the close control of the 
Ministry of Defence. As a result, close relationships have been developed with state 
controlled armaments industries in other countries. 
 
3 The United Arab Emirates in the Balkans 
One geographic area that has seen an increase in UAE assistance and outward FDI 
has been the Western Balkans. The initial steps could be seen over twenty years ago 
when the UAE provided significant financial contributions to facilitate post-conflict 
reconstruction in Bosnia.
25
 Thereafter, at the time of the 1999 Kosovo crisis, the UAE 
provided large amounts of aid to the Kosovo Albanian community. Since then, the 
UAE’s interest has expanded significantly in the region. The flow of official 
development assistance in the form of grants and concessional loans from the UAE to 
                                                 
24
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the Balkans amounted to US$61 million from 2009 to 2013.
26
 Interestingly, most of 
this has been focused on Albania, and to a lesser extent Montenegro, mostly in the 
form of grants.
27
 The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) provided a €36.7m 
concessionary loan to Albania for the construction of the Tirana-Elbasan road project, 
of which €13.9m was disbursed in 2012. The UAE has also funded the €16m Sheik 
Zayed airport in Kukes. The UAE is also the second largest non-EU donor to The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, just behind the USA in the size of 
donations of official aid.
28
 
Meanwhile, the Gulf States including the UAE have also been increasing their 
development aid to Serbia, the largest country in the Western Balkans. In December 
2012, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development provided a €25 million loan 
to the government of Serbia to continue reconstruction of the Prokop train station to 
take international traffic, replacing the central Belgrade railway station and freeing up 
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land in the city centre for urban redevelopment.
29
 The loan was provided at a 
concessionary interest rate of 3% per annum to be repaid over a period of 18 years 
with a grace period of 4 years. Tender documentation was ready in 2013, and the 
invitation to tender was published in January 2014.
30
 The Serbian company 
Energoprojekt won the tender for the construction of 10 platforms with a capacity of 
40,000 passengers per day. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
provided a further loan for this project. Meanwhile, in March 2014, the Department of 
Finance of Abu Dhabi signed a loan agreement with Serbia for US$1 billion (€750m) 




While aid has been an important feature of Gulf States’ involvement in the 
Western Balkans, there has also been a growth in commercial investments. In some 
cases, these have followed directly on the back of foreign aid. For example, in 
Montenegro, the Abu Dhabi Financial Group (ADFG) has developed the 1 million 
square foot Capital Plaza in the centre of Podgorica, the capital city, comprising a 
retail, business, hospitality and residential space.
32
 Meanwhile, ADFG has 
accumulated a land bank of 600,000 square metres in Serbia, Bulgaria and 
Montenegro and plans to carry out further projects worth €500 million over the next 
five years in these South East European countries, including housing projects on the 
Montenegro coastal area.
33
 At the same time, Buroj Property Development of Dubai 
has announced plans to invest €4.3 billion over the next eight years to build a luxury 
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tourist resort near Sarajevo, in Bosnia and Herzegovina
34
. The development will cover 
1.3 million square metres of land and will comprise thousands of housing units, hotels 
and the largest shopping centre in the country, creating 10,000 jobs and contributing 
to the development of the Bosnian tourism industry.  
 
4 United Arab Emirates’ commercial investments in Serbia 
Nowhere has this expansion in commercial investments in the Western Balkans been 
seen more obviously than in Serbia. While Serbia may not have been at the forefront 
of aid, UAE investments have developed rapidly in the country. Thus far, this has 
been focused on four specific areas, namely aviation, urban construction, military 
technology and agriculture. 
 
4.1 Air Serbia 
The UAE’s state-owned national carrier Etihad has been busy investing in failing 
foreign airlines to expand its strategic partners and network of destinations. By 2014, 
the Etihad Group had acquired minority equity stakes in Air Seychelles, Air Berlin, 
Virgin Australia, Aer Lingus, Jet Airways, Alitalia and Darwin Airline. The strategy 
has been to create a global network of connecting flights, with Abu Dhabi 
International Airport as the hub. The airline has now become one of a small group of 
“superconnector” airlines that are making significant competitive inroads into the 
traditional national carriers.
35
 In 2014, the partner airlines delivered more than 3.5 
million passengers to Etihad flights.
36
 
In August 2013, Etihad acquired a 49% stake in the Serbian national carrier 
JAT, adding the airline to its group of equity partners. Etihad has restructured the 
airline under a five-year management contract with the new name of Air Serbia. The 
investment has proved to be a great success. In 2014, the first full year of operation, 
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Air Serbia recorded a net profit of €2.7 million with revenues of €262 million, (an 
increase of 87% year-on-year) and carried 2.3 million passengers (an increase of 
68%).
37
 This success has reversed a €73 million loss made by JAT in 2013, and has 
turned the state-owned Belgrade Airport into one of the fastest growing airports in 
Europe with passenger numbers growing by 34% in 2014.
38
 The success of Air Serbia 
has continued into 2015 with revenues in both passenger and cargo divisions 
increasing rapidly. The company now employs 2,300 people. However, working 
conditions for employees might have deteriorated over issues such as working time 
and other aspects of industrial relations in comparison with the conditions enjoyed by 
staff employed by JAT. 
 
4.2 Investments in the arms industry 
The second major area of investment has been in the Serbian arms industry. Within 
former Yugoslavia, Serbia developed a significant and sophisticated arms industry 
that supplied the large Yugoslav armed forces and exported its products, including 
tanks and jet fighters, around the world. Yugoslavia developed significant trade links 
with the Gulf States under the umbrella of the Non-Aligned Movement of developing 
countries that Yugoslavia helped to found. In 1991, for example, the industry 
exported 149 M-84 tanks to Kuwait. However, the industry was badly damaged 
during the NATO bombing that took place in 1999. Since then, it has recovered and is 
now a surprisingly important part of the Serbian economy. Sales have been growing 
at a rate of 30% since 2002. By 2008, military exports were worth US$200 million, 
but between 2009 and 2011 exports of arms and military equipment were valued at 
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US$1.2 billion. The sector employs 10,000 people and accounts for 4% of the Serbian 
economy.
39
 The industry is managed under the umbrella of the Ministry Defence, 
with exports made exclusively through the state owned company Yugoimport-SDPR. 
Sixteen companies export military equipment and products through Yugoimport, 
forming a high technology segment of the Serbian economy. Since the industry is 
mostly state owned, the profits are ploughed back into the development of 
technological capacity. The industry has begun to produce increasingly sophisticated 
products including modernised versions of older designs for mobile howitzers, 
training planes, and fire control and anti-tank rocket systems. The arms industry is 
expected to become, “a driving force in the development of industrial production and 
the entire Serbian economy.”40 
In October 2013, the UAE strategic state investment company Mubadala 
Development signed an agreement with the Serbian government to identify areas for 
investment in aerospace manufacturing, telecoms, renewable energy and 
semiconductors.
41
 Numerous meetings have since taken place to develop defence 
cooperation between the two countries. In March 2014, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed 
Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UAE held a meeting with Nebojša 
Rodić, the Serbian Minister of Defence. The two agreed to intensify cooperation 
between the security and defence agencies.
42
 A defence cooperation agreement was 
signed in April 2014 to exchange information and technologies in the defence 
industry. The agreement encompassed training of UAE personnel including military 
police and Special Forces in the military academy in Serbia, and developing mid-
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 A joint statement to establish a strategic partnership and an 
agreement on joint development and acquisition were signed between Yugoimport 
SDPR and Emirates Advanced Research & Technology Holding LLC - EARTH. The 
first product of this collaboration has been the joint development of the Advanced 
Light Attack System (ALAS), a land-based anti-ship cruise missile, under a €200 
million contract that will pave the way for further cooperation between the two 
national industries. The UAE Navy first tested the missiles in late 2015. Although the 
ALAS export contract is tiny compared to the overall UAE defence budget, it is 
significant for the development of the Serbian military industrial complex. In a sign of 
the continuing nature of the collaboration between UAE and Serbia in the field of 
defence, Serbia has also signed MoUs with a number of UAE-based companies 
foreseeing the production of semiconductors and aircraft components. 
 
4.3 Agriculture 
A third area of significant investment has been agriculture. Due to its own limited 
food production capabilities, the UAE is highly dependent on food imports. Indeed, 
approximately 85% of its food supplies comes from abroad. Food security has 
therefore become a major foreign policy concern for the UAE. Domestic farming is 
limited due to the limits of available fresh water usage and the hot climate. Moreover, 
the Gulf States are also vulnerable to price fluctuations and a growing population. As 
a result, the UAE has sought to diversify its import sources and move away from 
previously monopolistic trade relationships. In common with other Gulf States, the 
UAE has been buying land in other countries with a more favourable climate such as 
Pakistan, Namibia, and Morocco in order to guarantee the supply of food under its 
own control. However, after having invested in countries that have weak governance 
structures and a poor rural infrastructure, the UAE is increasingly focused on 
countries with existing farming operations, such as New Zealand and Serbia, which 
                                                 
43
 Press release, “UAE partners with Serbia for military training”, Ministry of 
Defence of the Republic of Serbia, 26 Apr. 2014. The issue of military training 
capacity has become more important for UAE since the introduction of compulsory 
military service. 
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are seen as being more politically stable than African and Asian countries where UAE 
has made similar investments in the past.
44
 
The UAE owned Al Dahra Agricultural Company had already purchased 
cultivable land in Spain when, in 2012, it established a joint venture investment with 
the Serbian government to develop 9,000 hectares of farmland in the northern 
province of Vojvodina, to produce a range of crops, meat and dairy products.
45
 The 
US$400 million deal – which was signed by the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Zayed, and the Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić – came to 
fruition in March 2013 when Al Dahra purchased eight state owned agricultural 
companies and invested in a number of other agricultural ventures. Meanwhile, the 
UAE Development Fund simultaneously made a matching loan of US$400 million to 
the Serbian government for agricultural development.
46
 Looking ahead, the Abu 
Dhabi Development Fund plans to invest in food production in Serbia, and has signed 
an agreement with the Government of Serbia for long term agricultural development 
based on joint investment in state-owned farms with an aim to develop irrigation 
systems, machinery and agricultural infrastructure. In exchange, the Serbian 
Government guarantees food exports to the UAE to ensure her food security in the 
future. 
 
4.4 Belgrade Waterfront 
The fourth, and most recent, area of investment has been in construction. In January 
2013, Arabtec Holding, a construction company that is partly owned by Abu Dhabi 
investment fund Aabar, announced it would open a regional headquarters in Belgrade, 
                                                 
44
 Algethami, “GCC nations target farmland in stable countries”, Gulf News, 9th 
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land-based investments”, Bailey and Willoughby, Edible Oil: Food Security in the 
Gulf (2013), p.15. 
45
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the capital of Serbia, to drive its expansion into the Balkans.
47
 Aabar is a sovereign 
wealth fund established as a private joint stock company. It is wholly owned by the 
International Petroleum Investment Company, which is in turn wholly owned by the 
Government of UAE. Aabar’s mandate is to invest in sectors with significant growth 
potential that fulfil the investment strategy of the government of Abu Dhabi. 
However, the most important development was the decision by the UAE 
development company Eagle Hills to invest up to €3 billion in Serbia to build a 
business, residential and commercial area along the rundown riverfront of Belgrade. 
Eagle Hills is led by a team of executives from Emaar Properties PJSC, Dubai’s 
largest real estate firm. Mohamed Alabbar, Emaar’s chairman and board member of 
Eagle Hills,
48
 signed the contract with the Serbian government to redevelop the 1.8 




 The project includes a 140,000 square 
metre shopping mall that will be the largest in the Balkans; 5,700 homes to 
accommodate 14,000 people, eight hotels comprising a total of 2,200 rooms and a 
200-metre high tower. A contract has been signed with Starwood Hotels and Resorts 
                                                 
47
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to run one of the hotels, the first W Hotel in South East Europe
50
. Construction is 
planned over a period of 30 years, with at least half to be completed within 20 years. 
Eagle Hills owns 68% of the project, and the Serbian government owns the remaining 
32%. Under the terms of the contract, the Serbian government granted Eagle Hills a 
99-year lease on land for the regeneration scheme and in return, the investor has 
agreed to provide €150 million of cash investment and €150 million as a shareholder 
loan. The company will also lend the Serbian government another €130 million to buy 
packages of land in the development area which it does not already own and to clean 
up the area. Construction work is expected to create 20,000 jobs. The project has 
come under intense criticism from a local social movement known as “Ne davimo 
Beograd” (“Let’s not drown Belgrade”) on the grounds of architectural 
incompatibility with the surroundings, the non-transparent nature of the contract,
 51
 
the cost to the local government of site preparation, and the illegal demolition of 
buildings to make way for the development.
52
 Many observers have expressed 
concern about a project that they believe is aimed at the country’s wealthiest and will 
exclude the poor. As the organisers of a protest held on the day the construction 
project was inaugurated, 29 September 2015, stated, “the festive gathering of 
government officials and a false investor have laid down not the cornerstone of our 
economic development, but the coffin of public interest.”53  
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5 Serbia’s motives for accepting United Arab Emirates’ investments 
What has made the developing relationship between the UAE and Serbia particularly 
interesting to outside observers has been the political context within which it has 
taken place. Most notably, the ties between the two countries have emerged despite 
the strong support that the UAE has given to Kosovo. 
Without doubt, the single most important foreign policy issue for Serbia over 
the past decade and a half has been the Kosovo issue. Following the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, in the mid-1990s, Serbia was left in control of a southern province that 
was predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians that sought full independence. 
Having been denied the right to statehood by the international community, an armed 
insurgency was launched. By late 1998, this had brought Kosovo to the brink of full-
scale civil war and in early 1999, following a failed attempt to broker a peace deal, 
NATO conducted a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia. At the end of this, 
Kosovo, according to the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, was placed 
under UN administration. At the same time, a NATO led peacekeeping force (KFOR) 
was put on the ground to maintain peace and security. During this period, the UAE 
took an active role in Kosovo. Not only did contribute over 1,000 troops to KFOR,
54
 
it also played a significant role in humanitarian relief efforts by building an airport in 
the country and providing significant medical support to refugees. Indeed, Kosovo 
amounted to the UAE’s largest ever humanitarian mission.55  
                                                                                                                                           
interest” [Cukic, Sekulic, Slavkovic, and Vilenica, “Report from Belgrade 
Waterfront”, Eurozine, 6 May 2015, p.3]. For a full preliminary reading of the 
Belgrade Waterfront contract, see the opinions of lawyer Vladimir Gajić and law 




 It appears the UAE saw this as an excellent training and learning opportunity, 
working with NATO in conditions very different from those in the UAE [Anon., 
“UAE to Keep Troops in Kosovo”, Reuters, 14 Mar. 2000].  
55
 Anon., “It’s not enough for the UAE just to recognise Kosovo”, The National, 
26 Oct. 2008. 
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More controversially, the UAE has also become an important supporter of 
Kosovo’s quest for statehood. By way of brief background, in 2005 the United 
Nations Security Council authorised a process to determine the final status of Kosovo. 
While Serbia was willing to accept far-reaching autonomy for the province, the 
Kosovo Albanian community insisted that it would accept nothing less than full 
independence. Despite two and a half years of talks, the sides were unable to reach an 
agreement.
56
 Therefore, in February 2008, and acting with the support of the United 
States and many EU members, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Serbia 
strongly opposed this and immediately launched a major international campaign to 
stop it from being recognised.
57
 At the same time, Belgrade announced its intention to 
seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence. In order to do so, it needed to secure a 
resolution in the UN General Assembly. In the end, 77 countries voted in favour of 




Serbia hoped that the decision to seek a legal opinion on Kosovo’s 
independence would deter countries from recognising Kosovo until after the ICJ had 
produced its opinion. In this regard, it was actually broadly successful.
59
 However, 
some countries went ahead and recognised anyway. The UAE was one of them. On 
14 October 2008, less than a week after the General Assembly resolution, it became 
the 51
st
 UN member state to recognise Kosovo. In announcing the decision, the UAE 
Foreign Ministry stated that the country had taken its decision on the basis of, 
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“support for peoples’ legitimate right to self-determination.”60 Aside from the timing 
of the decision, what made the announcement a particular harsh blow for Serbia was 
the fact that the UAE was the first member of either the Arab League or the GCC to 
recognise Kosovo. As a result, the Kosovo issue placed diplomatic relations between 
the UAE and Serbia under considerable strain.
61
 
 Against this backdrop, the development of strong ties between Serbia and the UAE 
would seem unlikely. What changed matters was the election of a new government in 
Serbia in 2012 that quickly made it clear that it wished to look beyond the Kosovo 
issue. At the root of this policy reversal were two interrelated factors: Serbia’s dire 
economic situation and its renewed commitment to join the European Union (EU). 
The Serbian political leadership came to believe that the only long-term way to 
address Serbia’s severe economic woes was to secure membership of the EU. If this 
meant taking a pragmatic position over Kosovo, then so be it.
62
 This also opened the 
way for Serbia to take a more pragmatic view towards other potential investment 
partners. 
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In the case of the UAE, the emergence of the relationship appears to have 
come about almost entirely by accident. In an interview, Aleksandar Vučić, the 
current Prime Minister of Serbia, who was at the time the minister of defense and 
deputy prime minister, explained that he had met Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, one day for lunch: “I was invited 
to a restaurant for a lunch and he was there, totally surprised that I didn’t ask for 
anything…We talked about history, geography, philosophy. He personally saw me off 
to my room and after that, our friendship started.”63 Since then, not only has the 
economic relationship developed, but so has the political friendship. Certainly, the 
Serbian government is keen to emphasise the close personal ties that exist between the 
prime minister and the crown prince.
64
 This was seen particularly strongly during the 
2014 general elections, when Vučić “played up” his connections to the UAE, which 
he claimed would deliver billions of euros of investments to Serbia.
65
 President 
Tomislav Nikolić has also spoken effusively about the UAE. In an interview, he 
stated how much he enjoyed visiting the UAE. As he explained, “It is a feeling that 
you are among people who are like you, who are similar to you”. Likewise, he has 
also underlined the economic benefits of the relationship.
66
 Interestingly, and 
importantly, the development of close ties between Serbia and the UAE does not 
seem to have been affected by the fact that the key protagonist in the development of 
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ties with Belgrade, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, is also at the forefront of efforts to 
cement relations with Prishtina.
67
 
While it is clear that the relationship is based on economic synergies and 
mutual benefit and has been driven by good personal relations, many observers also 
believe that there is more to the burgeoning ties than is immediately apparent.
68
 In 
some cases, the explanations are rather innocuous and relate to Serbia’s wider 
strategic goals. For instance, some have suggested that it is part of an attempt by 
Belgrade to strengthen its EU accession hopes.
69
 According to this line of thinking, by 
showing that it has other economic options, the Serbian Government may hope to 
persuade the EU to take a more urgent and active approach towards accession talks. 
Another credible hypothesis is that Belgrade is also trying to counteract growing 
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worries within the European Union that Serbia is too close to Russia. By building its 
relations with the UAE, Belgrade could well be attempting to show the EU that it has 
other important international partners apart from Moscow.
70
 Neither of these claims 
would be outlandish, but it would seem that it is more a case that these are useful by-
products of the relationship, rather than the underlying rationale for it. However, more 
conspiratorially, some have even gone as far as to suggest the UAE is in fact acting as 
a proxy for the US and Israel and that the deals with Serbia have really been about 
procuring arms for certain groups in the Middle East.
71
  
Meanwhile, there have been claims that the relationship is being driven by 
corruption and political intrigue. Perhaps the most high profile allegations made so far 
centre on Etihad’s investment in Air Serbia, which even led to a public spat between 
the prime minister and a leading regional news organisation; a dispute that even drew 
in the EU representative in Belgrade.
72
 Given the sums of money involved and the 
widespread corruption that exists across the region as a whole, such allegations are 
not entirely surprising. However, as yet, none of these claims has been substantiated. 
Meanwhile, claims have also surfaced that the relationship is proving beneficial for 
the UAE. In early 2015, a report emerged that the Serbian Government had fast 
tracked a passport for Mohammad Dahlan, a close advisor to the crown prince and a 
“key rival of the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas”, who was known to be 
instrumental in facilitating the links between Serbia and the UAE.
73
 Perhaps more 
controversially, the UAE was directly implicated in Belgrade’s decision to appoint 
Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, as an advisor – a decision that caused 
considerable confusion, if not consternation, given his role in leading the NATO 
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bombing of Serbia in 1999. In this instance, the claim was that the UAE was directly 
bankrolling the consultancy.
74
 While there is little, if any, hard and fast evidence to 
support all these claims, there is also more than a little nervousness about delving too 
deep in any of these stories.
75
 Again, it would seem that, if these claims are true, they 
are again products of the relationship.  
Whatever the underlying reasons for the development of the ties, what can be 
said for certain is that there is a considerable degree of concern and scepticism in 
Serbia about the scale and rationale for the investments. There is a sense in some 
quarters that the government is in fact selling the country to the highest bidder and 
placing the interests of investors above those of its own people.
76
 As noted above, this 
has been particularly strongly felt in the case of the Belgrade Waterfront, especially 
given the concerns about the lack of transparency in the procedures and the 
willingness of the state to relax laws in order to accommodate investors. Meanwhile, 
for some the worries about the investments seem to be centred on more visceral fears. 
There have been concerns expressed about the implications of giving too much 
economic leverage to a Muslim country.
77
 However, such concerns appear to have 
limited traction. There is certainly little evidence to suggest that they reflect wider 
concerns. Indeed, the fact that the relationship was used so obviously as a campaign 
tactic on the 2014 election suggest that the government is aware that for as long as the 
relationship between Serbia and the UAE delivers tangible economic benefits, the 
population at large is likely to accept it. 
 
6 Conclusions 
In line with its growing efforts to extend its international reach and diversify its 
economy, the UAE has become an increasingly significant actor in the Western 
Balkans. At first centred on aid and assistance to the region, in recent years it has 
become an increasingly important commercial investor. Nowhere has this been seen 
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more clearly than in Serbia, where the UAE is now a major strategic partner. This has 
been centred on four particular sectors: (i) transport (the airline industry) (ii) the 
construction sector (urban design and build), (iii) agriculture (land ownership and 
food processing) and (iv) the arms industry and military cooperation. Each of the 
sectors has its own own specific role in the strategic aims of the UAE to diversify its 
economy in preparation for the post-oil era. Interestingly, these investment areas have 
matched the general trend of the UAE to focus on productive services and on key 
export sectors. As for the reasons for the interest in Serbia, it is clear that 
notwithstanding the excellent personal relationship that has developed at the highest 
levels in both countries, the UAE sees Serbia as a far more reliable and secure 
investment destination than many of the other countries with which it has built 
commercial relations in recent years. The question is how much further this 
investment activity can grow. Notwithstanding the self-imposed limitations on sectors 
where the UAE tends to invest, do falling energy prices mean that the UAE will have 
less money to invest in future and will Serbia be an early victim of any decision to cut 
back? 
From the Serbian side, UAE investments have come as an important boost at a 
time when the economy is facing serious difficulties. Despite the fact that the UAE 
has been a strong supporter of Kosovo’s independence and was the first Arab state to 
recognise it, since 2012 Belgrade has taken a far more pragmatic position on the 
issue, focusing instead on EU accession and economic development. This opened the 
door for the UAE to enter the Serbian economy, a process that was clearly based on 
the close ties that developed between the Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, 
and Crown Prince Mohammed. Of course, this has raised some eyebrows. Many feel 
that there must be more to it than the meeting of minds and strategic synergies. Aside 
from the wider geostrategic theories that have been mooted, this has led to 
accusations of corruption and political backscratching. At this stage, it seems unlikely 
that such claims will gain wider traction. The fact of the matter is that the investments 
from the UAE are simply too important for Serbia. However, the fact that they are so 
obviously based on personal relations does raise questions about the future. While 
there seems to be little likelihood that the government in Serbia will change in the 
next few years, is the relationship sufficiently robust in practical terms to see it 
continue in the event of a change in the political situation? 
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As things stand, the development of commercial relations between the UAE 
and Serbia has been a fascinating case study into UAE foreign policy. It has offered 
further proof of the way in which the country is seeking to expand its foreign policy 
horizons and also how it has tended to focus on specific areas. At the same time, it 
provides an interesting case study of how the UAE can build ties even with states with 
which it may have had difficult diplomatic relations in the past. As has been shown, at 
this stage the investments seem to be built on solid foundations, both economically 
and politically. However, looking ahead, there are clear questions as to how 
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